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NOTES
TAXATION - Creation of an Accountant Work-Product
Privilege for Tax Accrual Workpapers. United States v. Ar-
thur Young & Co., 104 S. Ct. 1495 (1984).
Section 7602 of the Internal Revenue Code' provides the
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) with the ability to summon a
wide variety of corporate taxpaper records. Recently, a
controversy has developed because certified public account-
ants (CPA's) have resisted disclosure of tax accrual
workpapers to the IRS.3 Tax accrual workpapers are docu-
1. Section 7602(a) provides:
For the purpose of ascertaining the correctness of any return, making a
return where none has been made, determining the liability of any person for
any internal revenue tax or the liability at law or in equity of any transferee or
fiduciary of any person in respect of any internal revenue tax, or collecting any
such liability, the Secretary is authorized -
(1) To examine any books, papers, records, or other data which may be
relevant or material to such inquiry;
(2) To summon the person liable for tax or required to perform the act, or
any officer or employee of such person, or any person having possession, cus-
tody, or care of books of account containing entries relating to the business of
the person liable for the tax or required to perform the act, or any other person
the Secretary may deem proper, to appear before the Secretary at a time and
place named in the summons and to produce such books, papers, records, or
other data, and to give such testimony, under oath, as may be relevant or mate-
rial to such inquiry; and
(3) To take such testimony of the person concerned, under oath, as may be
relevant or material to such inquiry.
I.R.C. § 7602(a) (1982) (as amended by the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act
of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, Title III § 333(a), 96 Stat. 622 (1982)).
2. See, e.g., United States v. Euge, 444 U.S. 707 (1980) (handwriting exemplars);
United States v. Bisceglia, 420 U.S. 141 (1975) ("John Doe" summons to discover
identity of a bank depositor enforced); United States v. Noall, 587 F.2d 123 (2d Cir.
1978) (internal audit reports), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 923 (1979); United States v. Da-
vey, 543 F.2d 996 (2d Cir. 1976) (computer tapes); Foster v. United States, 265 F.2d
183 (2d Cir.) (bank signature cards, cancelled checks, and ledger sheets), cert. denied,
360 U.S. 912 (1959).
3. See, e.g., Caplin, Should the Service be Permitted to Reach Accountants' Tax
Accrual Workpaers?, 51 J. TAXN' 194 (1979); Garbic & Struntz, The Second Circuit's
Arthur Young Decision: .4 Privilegefor Tax Accrual Workpapers, 57 J. TAX'N 66
(1982); Moses, Issuance and Enforcement of LAS. Summonses Against Third-tarty
Record Keepers, 60 TAXES 66, 72-79 (1981); R.S. EyesAccountants' Workpapers, 67
A.B.A. J. 1703 (1981); Note, Government Access to Corporate Documents andAuditor's
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ments prepared by a corporation's independent auditor in
the course of the regular financial audits required by federal
securities laws.4 These workpapers include valuable evalua-
tions and analyses of a corporation's contingent tax liabil-
ity,5 but are not used in the preparation of the corporate tax
return.6
In United States v. Arthur Young & Co.7 the United States
Supreme Court ordered enforcement of an IRS summons of
workpapers.8 The Court held that the independent auditors'
tax accrual workpapers were relevant to an IRS tax investi-
gation of the Amerada Hess Corporation 9 and refused to
protect the workpapers through a judicially created account-
ant work-product privilege.' 0 In rendering this decision, the
Supreme Court sought to resolve the disagreement among
lower courts on the issues of the relevancy of the workpapers
to IRS investigations and whether the workpapers should be
privileged.
This Note will analyze the Arthur Young decision, its ra-
tionale, and its impact. Section I will provide a statement of
the case. Section II will present essential background infor-
mation, and section III will analyze the Court's decision and
its reasoning. The Note concludes with a call for congres-
sional action to protect the strong policy interests affected by
the Court's decision.
I. THE CASE
The certified public accounting firm of Arthur Young &
Company audited and certified the Amerada Hess Co.rpora-
tion's financial statements for the period of 1972 through
Workpapers: Shall We Include Auditors Among the Privileged Few, 2 J. CORP. LAW
349, 356 (1977).
4. See United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 104 S. Ct. 1495, 1499-1500 (1984);
Caplin, supra note 3, at 194.
5. Arthur Young & Co., 104 S. Ct. at 1500. See Caplin, IAS. Toughens its Stance
on Summoning Accountants' Tax Accrual Workpapers, 53 J. TAX'N 130, 130 (1980).
6. See United States v. Coopers & Lybrand, 550 F.2d 615, 621 (10th Cir. 1977);
Caplin, Government Access to Independent Accountants' Tax Accrual Workpapers, 1
VA. TAX REV. 57, 69 (1981); Caplin, supra note 5; Caplin, supra note 3, at 194.
7. 104 S. Ct. 1495 (1984).
8. See id. at 1505.
9. See id at 1502.
10. See id. at 1505.
[Vol. 68:155
ACCOUNTANT WORK PRODUCT
1974.11 Publicly owned companies like Amerada Hess are
required to undergo annual audits and certification of their
financial statements in order to comply with requirements of
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).12 The IRS,
during a routine audit of Amerada's income tax liability for
the period of 1972 through 1974, uncovered a questionable
payment. 3 As a result, the IRS instituted a criminal investi-
gation.14 As part of the joint civil and criminal investigation,
the IRS issued a summons, pursuant to section 7602, re-
questing Arthur Young's tax accrual workpapers regarding
the Amerada Hess Corporation for the years 1972 through
1974.'5 Because Arthur Young refused to comply with the
summons, the IRS commenced an action in federal district
court in an effort to obtain judicial enforcement. 6 The dis-
trict court ordered enforcement of the summons, 17 holding
that the tax accrual workpapers were relevant to an IRS tax
investigation, 8 and refused to protect the workpapers
through recognition of an accountant-client privilege.' 9
A divided Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the
district court's order enforcing the summons. 20  The court,
utilizing the prevailing Second Circuit relevancy test,2 '
agreed with the district court that the CPA's tax accrual
11. United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 104 S. Ct. 1495, 1498 (1984).
12. See Regulation S-X, 17 C.F.R. § 210.5-02(25) (1981). The SEC requires the
filing of financial statements as part of: (1) registration statements under the Securi-
ties Act of 1933, Schedule A (25) - (27), 15 U.S.C. § 77aa (1982); (2) registration state-
ments under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404 §§ 12(b)(1)(J)-(L), 12(g)(1),
48 Stat. 892, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i4b)(1)(J)-(L), 781(g)(1) (1982); (3) proxy and information
statements under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 14, 15 U.S.C. § 78n (1982);
Schedule 14A, Item 15, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101 (1982); and (4) annual reports under
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §§ 13(a)(2), 15(d), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(a)(2),
78o(d) (1982); 17 C.F.R. §§ 249.310, 249.460 (1982).
13. Arthur Young, 104 S. Ct. at 1498.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id at 1499.
18. Id.
19. Id
20. United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 677 F.2d 211, 214 (2d Cir. 1982), aff'd
in part and rev'd in part, 104 S. Ct. 1495 (1984).
21. Id. at 218. For an expression of this test, see infratext accompanying note 22.
This standard has been consistently used by the Second Circuit. See, e.g., United
States v. NoaH, 587 F.2d 123, 125-26 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 923 (1979);
United States v. Shlom, 420 F.2d 263, 265 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1074
1984]
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workpapers were relevant under section 7602 because the
workpapers "might have thrown light upon the correctness
of the taxpayer's return. 22
However, the court of appeals majority, in a departure
from the district court decision, fashioned an accountant
work-product privilege for tax accrual workpapers prepared
in connection with the audit of a publicly held company.23
The court noted that disclosure of an auditor's tax accrual
workpapers would provide the IRS with an unfair advantage
in litigation with the corporate taxpayer.24 In addition, the
court concluded that the public interest in candid communi-
cation between corporation management and the auditor
would be threatened and, as a result, would increase the
likelihood of inaccurate financial statements. 25 As a conse-
quence, the court created an accountant work-product privi-
lege in order to protect the integrity of the securities
markets.26
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari,27
and in an unanimous decision, affirmed the Second Circuit's
ruling on the relevance of the tax accrual workpapers to an
IRS tax investigation.28 However, the Court reversed the
Second Circuit's ruling which protected the tax accrual
workpapers under a judicially created work-product
immunity.29
(1970); Foster v. United States, 265 F.2d 183, 186-87 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 360 U.S.
912 (1959).
22. Arthur Young, 677 F.2d at 218-19.
23. See id. at 221.
24. See id. at 220.
25. Id. at 219.
26. Id. at 219-21. Judge Newman, dissenting, argued against the creation of a
work-product privilege for the tax accrual workpapers. Creation of an accountant
work-product privilege is a matter for Congress, not the courts, according to New-
man. In addition, he disputed the policy arguments purported by the majority. Id. at
221-24 (Newman, J., dissenting).
27. United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 103 S. Ct. 1180 (1983).
28. See Arthur Young, 104 S. Ct. at 1502.
29. See id at 1505.
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II. BACKGROUND
A. The Certified Public Accountant's Audit
A CPA audits a company to render an opinion as to
whether the company's financial statements fairly present
the financial position of the company. An accountant's audit
also includes the results of the company's operations and
any changes in its financial position for the period under au-
dit.30  The auditor must conduct the audit in compliance
with generally accepted auditing standards3' and determine
30. See generally AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS
(AICPA), A Professional Standards (CCH) AU § 509 (June 1, 1984). There are four
kinds of auditors' opinions: (1) "An unqualied opinion states that the financial state-
ments present fairly financial position, results of operations, and changes in financial
position in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) consist-
ently applied." Id at AU § 509.28; (2) An adverse opinion is rendered when the finan-
cial statements are not fairly presented. Id. at AU § 509.41; (3) "A disclaimer of
opinion states that the auditor does not express an opinion on the financial state-
ments." Id at AU § 509.45; (4) "A qualifed opinion states that, 'except for' or 'subject
to' the effects of the matter to which the qualification relates," the financial statements
are fairly presented. Id. at AU § 509.29.
3 1. Generally Accepted Auditing Standards (GAAS) are adopted by the Ameri-
can Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) and published in the State-
ments on Auditing Standards (SAS). GAAS deal with the auditor's professional
qualities and judgment exercised in the performance of his examination and report.
Id. at AU §§ 150.01 to 150.02. The GAAS are:
General Standards
1. The examination is to be performed by a person or persons having ade-
quate technical training and proficiency as an auditor.
2. In all matters relating to the assignment, an independence in mental atti-
tude is to be maintained by the auditor or auditors.
3. Due professional care is to be exercised in the performance of the exami-
nation and the preparation of the report.
Standards of Field Work
1. The work is to be adequately planned and assistants, if any, are to be prop-
erly supervised.
2. There is to be a proper study and evaluation of the existing internal con-
trol as a basis for reliance thereon and for the determination of the resultant
extent of the tests to which auditing procedures are to be restricted.
3. Sufficient competent evidential matter is to be obtained through inspec-
tion, observation, inquiries, and confirmations to afford a reasonable basis for
an opinion regarding the financial statements under examination.
Standards of Reporting
I. The report shall state whether the financial statements are presented in
accordance with generally accepted accounting principles.
2. The report shall state whether such principles have been consistently ob-
served in the current period in relation to the preceding period.
3. Informative disclosures in the financial statements are to be regarded as
reasonably adequate unless otherwise stated in the report.
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whether the corporation's financial statements conform to
generally accepted accounting principles 3 2Generally accepted accounting principles require an au-
ditor to analyze a company's contingent liabilities.3 3 The po-
tential for assessment of additional taxes, resulting from a
deficiency in tax liability as reported on the corporate return,
represents one type of contingent liability.34 An auditor
4. The report shall either contain an expression of opinion regarding the fi-
nancial statements, taken as a whole, or an assertion to the effect that an opin-
ion cannot be expressed. When an overall opinion cannot be expressed, the
reasons therefor should be stated. In all cases where an auditor's name is asso-
ciated with financial statements, the report should contain a clear-cut indica-
tion of the character of the auditor's examination, if any, and the degree of
responsibility he is taking.
AICPA, A Professional Standards (CCH) AU § 150.02 (June 1, 1984).
32. "Generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) constitute at a given
point in time a consensus of how financial transactions should be recorded." D.
KIESO & J. WEYGANT, INTERMEDIATE ACCOUNTING 44 (2d ed. 1977). GAAP in-
cludes detailed accounting procedures. Id. at 45.
"Auditing 'standards' differ from auditing 'procedures' in that 'procedures' relate
to the acts to be performed, whereas 'standards' deal with measures of the quality of
the performance of those acts and the objectives to be attained by the use of the
procedures undertaken." AICPA, A Professional Standards (CCH) AU § 150.01
(June 1, 1984).
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) include Statements on Finan-
cial Accounting Standards promulgated by the AICPA's Financial Accounting Stan-
dards Board (FASB, formerly the Accounting Principles Board) in conjunction with
certain Accounting Research Bulletins and APB opinions which are not superseded
by FASB statements. AICPA, B Professional Standards (CCH) ET § 203.03 (June 1,
1984). In addition, GAAP includes "practices having general acceptance but which
are not covered in any official pronouncement." J. ROBERTSON, AUDITING 47 (1st ed.
1976).
33. FASB Accounting Standards Current Text C59. 101 (June 1, 1984) (incorpo-
rating FASB 5, as amended) provides: "[A] contingency is defined as an existing
condition, situation, or set of circumstances involving uncertainty as to possible gain
• . . or loss. . . to an enterprise that will ultimately be resolved when one or more
future events occur or fail to occur." id.
34. See W. MEIGS, E. LARSEN & R. MEIGS, PRINCIPLES OF AUDITING 605-06
(6th ed. 1977). This possible future tax assessment is attributable, in part, to the sub-
jective nature of the Code provisions and, as a consequence, the varying interpreta-
tions given to the Code provisions by the taxpayer and the IRS. See, e.g., United
States v. El Paso Co., 682 F.2d 530, 534 (5th Cir. 1982) ("The income tax laws, as
every citizen knows, are far from a model of clarity."), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1927
(1984); United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 677 F.2d 211, 220 (2d Cir. 1982) (The
tax code "is not cast in black and white. ... ).
The liability is also dependent on the occurrance of an IRS audit of the taxpayer's
return. Therefore, before the filing of the corporate tax return and the settlement of
the tax liability as the result of an IRS audit, the corporation incurs a contingent
liability. W. MEIGs, E. LARSEN & R. MEIGS, supra note 34, at 605-06.
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must estimate the probability of an IRS audit3 5 and the mag-
nitude of a future tax assessment. 6 An evaluation of the
magnitude of a tax deficiency requires an auditor to prepare
a "worst-case" analysis.3 7 The independent auditor's analy-
sis of the corporation's contingent tax liability is documented
in the tax accrual workpapers 8
35. A large corporate taxpayer has a high probability of being audited. See, e.g.,
United States v. El Paso Co., 682 F.2d 530, 533 (5th Cir. 1982) (audited every year
since 1940s), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1927 (1984); United States v. Coopers & Lybrand,
413 F. Supp. 942, 949 (D. Colo. 1975) (audited every year since 1913), a'd, 550 F.2d
615 (10th Cir. 1977). See also Kurtz & Panel, Discussion on "Questionable Positions,"
32 TAX LAW. 13, 15 (1978) (IRS audits 100% of returns for the largest corporations).
36. FASB Accounting Standards Current Text C59.105 (June 1, 1984).
37. See AICPA, A Professional Standards (CCH) AU § 337.05 (June 1, 1984).
M. Stone, Past President of the AICPA, testified that the worst case analysis
determines
what the worst possible nightmare is the client can conceive can happen if
every assumption on which he based his tax were to go against him in some
kind of litigation.
He may think up contingencies even more lurid than the worst contingen-
cies a revenue agent comes up with ....
United States v. Coopers & Lybrand, 413 F. Supp. 942, 953 (D. Colo. 1975), aff'd, 550
F.2d 615 (10th Cir. 1977). See also Caplin, supra note 3, at 195; Nath, Internal Jeve-
nue Service Summonsesfor "Sensitive"Accountants' Papers, 34 VAND. L. REv. 1561,
1571 (1981).
38. Tax accrual workpapers include:
(1) discussions by the CPA with officials and/or legal counsel of the taxpayer
of tax return reporting positions which may be controversial, either because of
close factual questions or because of uncertain statutory, administrative or ju-
dicial authority; (2) analysis of possible positions or courses that the IRS might
take or pursue upon examination of the return; (3) evaluation of the hazards of
litigation on these issues, separately or in the aggregate; (4) an estimation of
the additional tax that might result from an administrative settlement or litiga-
tion; (5) opinion letters from legal counsel concerning proposed transactions or
pending income tax return controversies and forecasting possible outcomes; (6)
accounting and/or legal analyses of issues that might be controverted, and ex-
pert accounting and/or legal opinions as to the propriety of the records main-
tained and the tax return positions taken; (7) various speculations, theories,
estimates, conjectures, ideas, and other interpretive and judgmental materials
used to analyze such issues and make recommendations thereon; (8) predic-
tions as to pending legislation and evolving administrative interpretations; (9)
consideration of possible requests for letter rulings; (10) memoranda and re-
search of pertinent authorities; and (11) communications between and among
the taxpayer, his legal counsel, and his independent auditors on any or all of
the above matters.
Diss, The IRS and Auditors' Tax Workpapers: How Far Is Too Far ARTHUR
YOUNG J. 10, 15 (Summer & Autumn 1976).
The workpapers, whether initially prepared by the corporation or the auditor, are
the property of the CPA. They are, however, subject to ethical limitations vis-a-vis
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B. The Dispute
Corporate taxpayers, CPA's, and the IRS have become
entangled in ligitation regarding the ability of the IRS to
summon, under section 7602, the auditor's tax accrual
workpapers. CPA's argue that IRS access to the tax accrual
workpapers will impair auditor-client communications 39
and, as a consequence, will thwart performance of a satisfac-
tory audit.40 A corporation will withhold vital information
from the auditor to avoid supplying the IRS with a "road
map" of the "soft spots" in the corporation's tax return.
4
'
Inquiries and candid discussions with management consti-
tute indispensable evidentiary tools enabling the auditor to
more accurately ascertain a corporation's financial health.42
An accurate assessment of a company's financial position
cannot be gleaned solely from an analysis of accounting
confidential relationships with clients. AICPA, A Professional Standards (CCH) AU
§ 339.06 (June 1, 1984).
39. See, e.g., United States v. Coopers & Lybrand, 413 F. Supp. 942, 953-54 (D.
Colo. 1975), af'd, 550 F.2d 615 (10th Cir. 1977). A past president of the AICPA, Mr.
Stone, testified:
Now, these are the kinds of problems which we are continually in contact
with our client about, are advising the client, are getting his feedback. If we
were hampered in any audit situation by the fact that the client knows that if
he gives us any data about that that it's going to be readily available to the
Government, I cannot imagine how we would be able to render audit opinions
for that client for very long. It would just absolutely cut off our communica-
tion, and if I were the client, I would be the first to admit that that is the way I
would feel.
413 F. Supp. at 954. See also United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 677 F.2d 211, 220
(2d Cir. 1982).
40. See, e.g., United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 677 F.2d 211, 220 (2d Cir.
1982); United States v. Price Waterhouse & Co., 515 F. Supp. 996, 1000 n.6 (N.D. Ill.
1981); United States v. Coopers & Lybrand, 413 F. Supp. 953 (D. Colo. 1975), aff'd,
550 F.2d 615 (10th Cir. 1977); Caplin, supra note 3, at 199; Garbis & Struntz, supra
note 3, at 67.
41. United States v. El Paso Co., 682 F.2d 530, 545 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
104 S. Ct. 1927. See United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 677 F.2d 211, 220 (2d Cir.
1982); United States v. Coopers & Lybrand, 550 F.2d 615, 621 (10th Cir. 1977);
United States v. Matras, 487 F.2d 1271, 1275 (8th Cir. 1973); Caplin, supra note 5, at
130; Caplin, supra note 3, at 194.
42. According to the third Standard of Field Work of Generally Accepted Audit-
ing Standards, "[s]ufficient competent evidential matter is to be obtained through in-
spection, observation, inquiries, and confirmation." AICPA, A Professional
Standards (CCH) AU § 150.02.
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records.43 Ultimately, the client's failure to provide an audi-
tor with the information necessary to make an accurate as-
sessment of the corporation's contingent tax liability will
result in the transmittal of inaccurate financial data to the
investing public.44
Corporate taxpayers contend that disclosure of their tax
accrual workpapers reveals their negotiation strategies and
settlement positions and would, therefore, provide the IRS
with an unfair advantage in litigating disputes.45 Corpora-
tions also argue that they possess a legitimate "expectation
of privacy" in sensitive information documented in tax ac-
crual workpapers.46
On the other hand, the IRS views tax accrual workpapers
as an invaluable investigative tool that can prevent a corpo-
rate taxpayer from hiding questionable tax positions among
an overwhelming number of business transactions and
records.47 Therefore, the IRS needs the tax accrual
workpapers as a "road map" highlighting the corporation's
tax positions and allowing for a more efficient investiga-
tion.4 8 Also, the corporation is more likely to discuss "ques-
tionable areas" with the auditor than an IRS agent.49
Therefore, the tax accrual workpapers provide the IRS with
a more thorough evaluation of the corporation. Further-
more, the IRS contends that the summons of a corporation's
tax accrual workpapers is consistent with the IRS's broad in-
vestigatory powers.50
43. See Note, Protecting the Auditor's Work Product from the IRS, 1982 DUKE
L.J. 604, 609.
44. See United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 677 F.2d 211, 220 (2d Cir. 1982).
See also Hanson & Brown, CPAs Workpapers: The IRS Zeroes In, J. ACCT. 68, 70
(July 1981).
45. See, e.g., United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 677 F.2d 211, 220 (2d Cir.
1982).
46. See id at 219-20; United States v. Coopers & Lybrand, 413 F. Supp. 942, 944
(D. Colo. 1975), a'd, 550 F.2d 615 (10th Cir. 1977); Caplin, supra note 3, at 199.
47. Hanson & Brown, supra note 44, at 70; Kurtz & Panel, supra note 35, at 15
(good chance questionable tax positions will not be found). Accord United States v.
El Paso Co., 682 F.2d 530, 533 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1927 (1984).
48. See United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 677 F.2d 211, 220 (2d Cir. 1982);
Caplin, supra note 5, at 130; Note, supra note 43, at 606.
49. See Note, supra note 43, at 609.
50. The IRS summons power has been referred to as "inquisitorial." See, e.g.,
United States v. Bisceglia, 420 U.S. 141, 147 (1975); United States v. Matras, 487 F.2d
1271, 1274 (8th Cir. 1973); Falsone v. United States, 205 F.2d 734, 737 (5th Cir.), cert.
1984]
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C. Disagreement Among the Courts
There is wide disagreement among courts regarding the
resolution of this controversy. The development of the law
in this area hinges on three principal cases. In United States
v. Coopers & Lybrand5 the Tenth Circuit was the first ap-
peals court to address the validity of an IRS summons of tax
accrual workpapers under section 7602.2 The court denied
the IRS access to a CPA's tax accrual workpapers, ruling
that the workpapers were not relevant within the context of
section 7602.53 In appraising section 7602 relevance, the
court considered whether the summoned information was
used in preparing the corporation's income tax return.5 4
In United States v. Pennington55 the Eleventh Circuit
ruled that the independent auditor's tax accrual workpapers
were relevant to an IRS investigation of a corporation's tax
liability. 6 The court employed a test that determined
whether the information "might throw light upon the cor-
rectness of the taxpayer's return; and more narrowly,
whether there is an indication of a realistic expectation
rather than an idle hope that something might be discov-
ered."57 The court of appeals refused to create a work prod-
uct privilege.5 Instead, it felt that Congress was the proper
denied, 346 U.S. 864 (1953). The IRS summons power has also been analogized to
that of a grand jury. See, e.g., United States v. Bisceglia, 420 U.S. 141, 147 (1975);
United States v. Rosinsky, 547 F.2d 249, 252-53 (4th Cir. 1977); United States v. Ma-
tras, 487 F.2d 1271, 1274 (8th Cir. 1973); United States v. Ryan, 455 F.2d 728, 733
(9th Cir. 1972); United States v. Widelski, 452 F.2d 1, 4 (6th Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
406 U.S. 918 (1972); Foster v. United States, 265 F.2d 183, 186-87 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 360 U.S. 912 (1959). See generally Fink, Internal Revenue Service Summons
Power, 38 N.Y.U. INsT. FED. TAX §§ 19.01-.08 (1980).
51. 550 F.2d 615 (10th Cir. 1977).
52. See id at 620-21.
53. See id at 621.
54. See id. at 619. The court also incorporated policy arguments into its rele-
vancy decision considering the fairness of imposing "unnecessary burdens on the tax-
payer. . . where there is no indication of an attempt to escape liability." Id at 621
(quoting United States v. Matras, 487 F.2d 1271, 1274-75 (8th Cir. 1973)).
55. 718 F.2d 1015 (11th Cir. 1983).
56. See id. at 1020.
57. Id. at 1019 (quoting United States v. Wyatt, 637 F.2d 293, 300-01 (5th Cir.
1981)).
58. See 718 F.2d at 1021.
[Vol. 68:155
ACCO UNTANT WORK PROD UCT
body to make any decision to limit IRS summons power5 9
In United States v. Arthur Andersen60 the Massachusetts
District Court held that an independent auditor's tax accrual
workpapers were relevant in regard to a section 7602 sum-
mons.61 The court devised a relevancy standard based on
whether there was an "indication of realistic expectation
rather than an idle hope something may be discovered" in
the workpapers. 62 The court held that an IRS agent's "col-
lective familiarity" with taxpayer records constituted a "real-
istic expectation. '63
III. ANALYSIS
In United States v. Arthur Young & Co.64 the Supreme
Court held that the IRS has the authority to summon, under
section 7602, an independent certified public accountant's
tax accrual workpapers prepared in the course of a corpora-
tion's annual financial audit.65 The Court rested its decision,
in part, on the relevance of the independent auditor's tax ac-
crual workpapers to the IRS's investigation of corporate tax
liability.66 The Court also ruled that a CPA's tax accrual
workpapers will not be protected from an IRS section 7602
summons through a judicially created accountant work-
59. See id The workpapers in this case were prepared by an independent auditor
of a closely held corporation. Therefore, the court adamantly refused to protect the
workpapers due to the absence of counterveiling policies. See id.
60. 474 F. Supp. 322 (D. Mass 1979), appeal dismissed as moot, 623 F.2d 720 (Ist
Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1021 (1980).
61. See id. at 329-30.
62. Id.
63. Id The court rejected the relevancy criteria established by the Tenth Circuit
in United States v. Coopers & Lybrand, 550 F.2d 615 (10th Cir. 1977), because it felt
that whether the information was used in preparing the corporate tax return should
not be determinative in evaluating relevance. In addition, unlike the Tenth Circuit's
relevancy standard, the Arthur Andersen court did not consider policy considerations
as factors which input into a decision regarding § 7602 relevancy. 474 F. Supp. at
326-27.
The corporate taxpayer and CPA in the Arthur Andersen case argued for a judi-
cially created accountant-client privilege which would protect the confidentiality of
auditor-client communications, and more specifically, the tax accrual workpapers.
The court refused to create this privilege. See id.
64. 104 S. Ct. 1495 (1984).
65. See id at 1505.
66. See id at 1501-02.
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product privilege.67
An examination of these holdings reveals the inadequa-
cies in the Court's approach. Due to this decision's inevita-
ble impact upon the securities market, Congress must take
action to restrict IRS summons authority.
A. Relevancy
The Court ruled that items of "potential relevance to an
ongoing [IRS] investigation" are within section 7602's
meaning of "relevant. 68 The Court's formulation of the rel-
evancy standard is inadequate for several reasons. First, the
test provides essentially no limitation upon IRS summons
authority and therefore allows the Service to enjoy unlimited
investigative power.69 Furthermore, the language of section
7602(a) requires a showing of "relevance . . . to such in-
quiry.' 70 The context of the section 7602 inquiry refers to
the "correctness of any return," not the performance of the
investigation itself.71 Therefore, the standard established by
the court is overbroad.
In addition, the plain meaning of the statute indicates
that factual materials are relevant and that nonfactual opin-
ions and thoughts are not relevant.72 Consequently, the non-
67. See id at 1504.
68. Id. at 1501. The Court noted that the relevancy standard used in determining
whether items are admissible in federal court is not to be used in an evaluation of the
relevance of an IRS summons. The Court stressed that a finding of relevance will not
be barred solely because the tax accrual workpapers are not used in the preparation of
the tax return. Although the language is different, the Court has essentially adopted
the Second Circuit's "might throw light" relevancy standard. See supra notes 21-22
and accompanying text. In effect, both standards provide the IRS with the authority
to summon virtually anything remotely related to the taxes. No finding of "reason-
able expectation" or other restriction is specified in the test. Id.
69. Under the Court's formulation of the relevancy standard, practically every
corporate document would fall within the court's relevancy standard. The standard
also conflicts with the Court's previous rulings which protect CPA's from "fishing
expeditions" in their workpapers. See United States v. Bisceglia, 420 U.S. 141, 146
(1975). 4ccord Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U.S. 440, 445 (1964).
70. I.R.C. § 7609(a) (1984).
71. United States v. El Paso Co., 682 F.2d 530, 546-47 (5th Cir. 1982) (Garwood,
J., dissenting).
72. See Caplin, supra note 3, at 199. Former Commissioner of Internal Revenue
Mortimer Caplin stated, "[w]hat comes to mind in the use of that term [data] are
items such as books, records, and other factual materials - not opinions, projections,
conjectures and other thought processes." Id See also P.T. & L. Constr. Co. v. Coin-
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factual opinions and speculations contained in the tax
accrual workpapers are not within the plain meaning of the
statute.
The Court relied heavily on the statutory language of
section 7602 in establishing the relevancy test. 3 However,
the notion of relevancy entails a weighing of factors74 on a
"case-by-case" basis.7 5  Although the Court recognized one
policy factor - the importance of broad summons authority
to revenue collection76 - the Court ignored other policy fac-
tors, such as public interest in preventing disclosure of confi-
dential information.77
Lastly, the Court noted that the broad summons author-
ity of the IRS is critical to the IRS's ability to perform its
missioner, 63 T.C. 404, 414 (1974) ("[mlental impressions, legal analysis, conclusions,
and recommendations are generally not relevant.").
73. "The language 'may be' reflects Congress' express intention to allow the IRS
to obtain items of even potential relevance. .. ." Arthur Young, 104 S. Ct. at 1501.
74. See C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 77, at 159-60
(2d ed. 1972). The author stated:
Reconciling interests in privacy and confidentiality with the needs of litigants
is not readily achieved in terms of broad categories; it calls for the finer touch
of the specific solution. A tool already at hand, though perhaps largely unrec-
ognized, consists of recognizing standing on the part of the possessor of infor-
mation to question the legitimacy of need for it in litigation, i.e., to raise issues
of relevancy in the broad sense. A similar thread runs through the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure limitation of discovery to matters "relevant to the
subject matter involved in the pending action." Relevancy itself, of course,
contemplates a process of weighing, and inevitably the judge must be accorded
a substantial measure of discretion.
See also Caplin, supra note 6, at 65 ("relevance varies with a number of factors");
Comment, Internal Revenue Service Accessibility to Auditors' Tax Accrual
Workpapers, 72 GEO. L.J. 1211, 1227-28 (1984) (advocating a relevancy standard
which balances conflicting policy considerations); Note, Government Access to Corpo-
rate Documents andAuditors' Workpapers: Shall We IncludeAuditorsAmong the Priv-
ileged Few?, 2 J. CORP. L. 349, 381-82 (1977); Note, Auditor-Client Work-Product
Privilege With Respect to Tax Accrual File: The Arthur Young Case, 27 ST. Louis
U.L.J. 437, 453-54 (1983); Note, A Balancing Approach to the Discoverability of Ac-
countants' Tax Liability Workpapers Under Section 7602 of the Internal Revenue Code,
60 WASH. U.L.Q. 185, 203-05 (1982).
75. United States v. Matras, 487 F.2d 1271, 1274 (8th Cir. 1973). See also Caplin,
supra note 6, at 65 ("particular kind of document may be relevant in one context but
not in another"); Note, A Balancing Approach to the Discoverability of Accountants'
Tax Liability Workpapers Under Section 7602 of the Internal Revenue Code, 60 WASH.
U.L.Q. 185, 203 (1982). See generally James, Relevancy, Probability and the Law, 29
CALIF. L. REV. 689, 690 (1941).
76. SeeArthur Young, 104 S. Ct. at 1501.
77. See supra notes 39-44 and accompanying text.
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function.7 8 Therefore, the Court rejected a narrower defini-
tion of relevance.79 However, the companies themselves
possess most of the information the IRS is seeking from the
tax accrual workpapers. 80 This availability diffuses the IRS's
"critical need" to summon the CPA's tax accrual
workpapers.
B. Accountant Work-Product Privilege
1. Congressional Intent for Judicial Review over IRS
Summons Authority
The Court interpreted the language in section 7602 as re-
flecting "a congressional policy choice in favor of disclosure
of all information relevant to the legitimate IRS inquiry. 81
According to the Court this broad authority should not be
restricted by the courts in the absence of "traditional privi-
leges and limitations, ' 'an or "unambiguous directions from
Congress. ' 3 The Court found no such directions from Con-
gress supporting the creation of an accountant work-product
immunity.84 The Court emphasized that any restriction on
the IRS summons authority "is a choice for Congress, and
not this Court. ... 85
Although Congress gave the IRS broad summons au-
thority, Congress did not make the summons power self-exe-
cuting; instead, Congress provided for review by the courts
as a check on potential abuse of summons power by the
IRS.86 Therefore, the Court's decision to reject limitations
on IRS summons power conflicts with clear congressional
78. Arthur Young, 104 S. Ct. at 1501.
79. See id.
80. Auditors disclose material problems in the tax accrual analysis to the com-
pany. See Chazen, Miller & Solomon, When the Rules Say "See Your Lawyer", J.
ACCT. 60, 66-70 (Jan. 1981). See also United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 677 F.2d
211, 220 (2d Cir. 1982) ("[t]he corporation's own books and the audit workpapers
furnish the IRS with all the raw data that it needs to calculate the taxpayer's tax
liability").
81. Arthur Young, 104 S. Ct. at 1502 (emphasis omitted).
82. Id. (quoting United States v. Euge, 444 U.S. 707, 714 (1980)).
83. 104 S. Ct. at 1502 (quoting United States v. Bisceglia, 420 U.S. 141, 150
(1975)).
84. 104 S. Ct. at 1502.
85. Id.
86. Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U.S. 440, 445-46 (1964). See United States v. Powell,
379 U.S. 48, 58 (1964).
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intent to provide for judicial review over IRS summons
authority. 7
2. Substantial Policy Considerations Require Protection
of Tax Accrual Workpapers
The Court determined that the work-product privilege,
recognized by the court of appeals, was "misplaced" because
the desired remedy, preservation of candid auditor-client
communication, "more closely resembled a testimonial ac-
countant-client privilege. ... 88 Therefore, the tax accrual
workpapers would be subject to an IRS summons because
an accountant-client privilege has not been recognized under
87. In addition, according to respondent's brief, congressional enactment of Sec-
tion 6661 of the Tax Equity and Financial Responsibility Act (TEFRA) of 1982 pro-
vides evidence that Congress has chosen to support protection of the independent
auditor's tax accrual workpapers from an IRS summons through the creation of an
accountant work-product privilege for them. Brief for Respondent at 30-33, United
States v. Arthur Young & Co., 104 S. Ct. 1495 (1984). The Second Circuit urged
Congress to "require that this material be made available, or that taxpayers flag their
questionable positions directly on their returns," if it concluded that the tax accrual
workpaper privilege would result in an excessive limitation on the function of the
IRS. United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 677 F.2d 211, 221 (2d Cir. 1982). Con-
gress subsequently enacted Section 6661 of TEFRA which levies a penalty for the
understatement of tax liability unless the taxpayer reveals on the tax return the rele-
vant facts underlying questionable tax positions. Because the Section 6661 provisions
dealt exclusively with relevant factual data revealed on the return, there is evidence
that Congress intends to exclude from the IRS any opinions located in the tax accrual
workpapers. Furthermore, the penalties prescribed by statute 6661 merely provide an
incentive encouraging voluntary taxpayer revelations. Disclosure, according to the
congressional scheme of revenue collection, is ultimately left to the discretion of the
taxpayer rather than compelled, as in the case of a summons of tax accrual
workpapers. See I.R.C. § 6661 (1984).
Also, Congress did not enact legislation in § 6661 to remove the previously estab-
lished accountant's tax accrual workpaper immunity created by the Second Circuit. It
has been held that the failure of Congress to amend legislation constitutes confirma-
tion of accepted judicial interpretations of unrevised legislation. Cf. Herman &
MacLean v. Huddleston, 103 S. Ct. 683, 689 (1983) (failure of Congress to act while
amending securities laws considered to be a confirmation of accepted judicial inter-
pretations of the unrevised legislation).
The legislative history further evidences the nexus between Section 6661 and Sec-
tion 7602. The Senate Committee on Finance reported, "the committee intends that
the Secretary shall in no event require the disclosure of accountant's work papers." S.
REP. No. 494, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 274, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 781, 1021. The considerable relationship between Section 6661 and Section
7602 provides a strong indication that congressional action in response to the Court's
decision regarding the tax accrual workpapers will be forthcoming.
88. Arthur Young, 104 S. Ct. at 1503.
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federal law, and "no state created privilege has been recog-
nized in federal cases."8 9 However, the work-product privi-
lege is designed to protect thought processes, mental
impressions, and opinions.90 Accountant-client communica-
tion is protected as incident to protecting the thought
processes. 91
The Court also rejected the argument that the accountant
work-product privilege is analogous to an attorney's work-
product privilege because of the CPA's role as a "public
watchdog."92 However, if corporate management is not can-
89. Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 335 (1973). Sixteen states have statutes
establishing an accountant-client privilege. See Note, An Appraisal of Arthur Young-
A Valuable PrivilegeforAccountants, 48 ALB. L. REv. 109, 142 n. 193 (1983). See also
Falsone v. United States, 205 F.2d 734, 740-42 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 864
(1953); Katsoris, Confidential Communications - The Accountants' Dilemma, 35
FORDHAM L. REv. 51, 67-68 (1966). See generally Note, supra note 3, at 369-73; Note,
Privileged Communications - Accountants and Accounting - A Critical Analysis of
Accountant-Client Privilege Statutes, 66 MICH. L. REV. 1264 (1968).
90. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 400 (1981). See United States v.
Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 238 (1975).
91. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 400. In Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947), attor-
ney-client communication was not classified as a testimonial privilege instead of a
"work-product" privilege. Id. at 510-11. See generally Cohn, The Work-Product Doc-
trine: Protection, Not Privilege, 71 GEO. L.J. 917, 922-25 (1983) (distinguishing testi-
monial attorney privilege from attorney work-product).
92. Arthur Young, 104 S. Ct. at 1503.
The Court also speculated that the creation of tax workpaper immunity might
impair the public's perception of the auditors' responsibilities as "watchdogs" and
consequently undermine the integrity of the securities market. Id. at 1504 n.15. Since
the work-product privilege has traditionally been limited to attorneys in their role as
advocates, the auditor might also be perceived as an advocate, favoring the client's
interests over those of the general public. However, there is no conflict in ideology as
a result of extending the work-product privilege from advocates, such as attorneys, to
public accountants whose role is viewed as independent. Both the accountant and
attorney work-product privileges protect "thought processes essential to achieve im-
portant public policy .... " Note, IRS Access to Tax Accrual Workpapers: Legal
Considerations andPolicy Concerns, 51 FORDHAM L. REV. 468-487 (1982). The attor-
ney work-product privilege effectuates an "orderly working of our system of legal
procedure." Id. (quoting Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 512 (1947)). Likewise, the
accountant work-product privilege safeguards the "national public interest [in] in-
sur[ing] the maintenance of fair and honest markets in [securities] transactions."
United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 677 F.2d 211, 219 (1982) (quoting 15 U.S.C.
§ 786).
In addition, the AICPA's professional standards will preserve the accountants' in-
dependence despite the creation of a tax accrual work-product privilege. The inde-
pendence standard provides: "In all matters relating to the assignment, an
independence in mental attitude is to be maintained by the auditor or auditors."
AICPA, A Professional Standards (CCH) AU § 150.02 (June 1, 1984). The threat of
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did with the auditor, the auditor will not obtain sufficient
evidence to perform the audit.93  Instead, the analogy be-
tween an accountant's and attorney's work product is quite
strong.94
According to the Court, the "integrity of the securities
markets" would not suffer from the lack of workpaper pro-
tection because the auditor should not, and does not, rely
solely on management's representations in preparing the au-
dit.95 However, the auditor, in order to properly evaluate the
financial condition of the company, often cannot obtain the
necessary information from any sources other than manage-
ment.96 The Court also believes that no company will risk
receiving a qualified opinion as a result of restricting the
scope of the auditor's examination. 97 But an auditor who
does not know the information exists cannot know the infor-
mation is missing; and as a result, the auditor will not be in a
position to qualify the opinion.9 Also, experience has
shown that disclosure of a CPA's tax accrual workpapers re-
sults in strained communication between the auditor and the
corporation undergoing the audit.99
malpractice liability resulting from a breach of the independence standard provides
accountants with sufficient incentive to maintain their independence.
The Court has failed to recognize the CPA's dual responsibilities of independence
to the public and confidentiality to the client. According to the AICPA Code of Eth-
ics, "A member shall not disclose any confidential information obtained in the course
of a professional engagement except with the consent of the client." AICPA, B Pro-
fessional Standards (CCH) ET § 301.01 (June 1, 1984). AICPA standards demon-
strate that independence is not jeopardized by privileges extended to auditor-client
communication. Therefore, perception that the public would view the accountant as
an advocate upon the establishment of a work-product privilege is unfounded.
93. See infra note 42 and accompanying text.
94. See Note, A Balancing Approach to the Discoverability of Accountants' Tax
Liability Workpapers Under Section 7602 of the Internal Revenue Code, 60 WASH.
U.L.Q. 185, 206-07 (1982) (observing that "the workpapers are a collection of poten-
tially adverse legal theories compiled by the accountant").
95. Arthur Young, 104 S. Ct. at 1503.
96. Id. at 1503-04.
97. See id.
98. Note, supra note 43, at 610.
99. Hanson & Brown, supra note 44, at 68 ("IRS activity already has caused a
deterioration of the accountant-client dialogue"). See also Interpretation Guides Audi-
tor Who Cannot Obtain Evidence on Income Tax Accruals, J. AcCT. at 18, 20 (Mar.
1981); Auditors Say IRS Demandfor Documents Is Poisoning Relations with Client
Firms, WALL ST. J., Jan. 15, 1981, at 25, col. 4.
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The Court also argues that the IRS has shown adminis-
trative sensitivity to the CPA's concerns, as evidenced by re-
cent revisions in the IRS policy manual °° tightening the
requirements for issuance of a summons of tax accrual
workpapers.' 0' However, the IRS manual dictates service
policy, but it does not provide the taxpayer with satisfactory
protection. 0 2 Also, in light of the expansive relevancy stan-
dard adopted by the Court, 10 3 the IRS will be free to inter-
pret the guidelines without meaningful judicial review.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Court's decision in Arthur Young will result in uni-
formity among lower courts concerning the ability of the
IRS to summon, under section 7602, tax accrual workpapers
prepared by a corporation's independent auditor. However,
the Court's section 7602 relevancy standard gives unlimited
summons authority to the IRS."° The Court's refusal to
limit this broad IRS summons authority through judicial
recognition of an accountant work-product privilege for a
CPA's tax accrual workpapers will further deteriorate the
auditor-client relationship and, consequently, threaten the
integrity of the securities markets. 0 5 Therefore, congres-
sional action is necessary to protect an independent auditor's
tax accrual workpapers from an IRS section 7602
summons. "
JAMES A. DOERING
100. See I Int. Rev. Man. (Audit) (CCH) § 4024.4 (May 14, 1981).
101. See Arthur Young, 104 S. Ct. at 1504.
102. See United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741 (1979) (evidence, obtained in
violation of IRS procedures, was not required to be excluded from trial where consti-
tutional or statutory rights were not affected); Pamell, The Internal Revenue Manual:
Its Utility and Legal Effect, 32 TAX LAW. 687 (1979); Parmell, Postscr#ot - The Inter-
nal Revenue Manual Its Utility and Legal Effect, 33 TAX LAW. 341 (1979). See also
United States v. I.C. Industries, Inc., 555 F. Supp. 219, 222 (N.D. I11. 1983); United
States v. Price Waterhouse & Co., 515 F. Supp. 996, 999 (N.D. Ill. 1981); United
States v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 474 F. Supp. 322, 331 (D. Mass. 1979).
103. See supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text.
104. See supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text.
105. See supra notes 95-99 and accompanying text.
106. The Securities and Exchange Commission and the investing public do not
possess adequate mechanisms to insure candid auditor-client communication and ac-
curate financial statements. The risk of shareholder suits and SEC investigations and
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ultimate prosecutions overlooks "the fact that the depth and quality of any investiga-
tions to ensure compliance with the law would suffer .... ." Upjohn Co. v. United
States, 449 U.S. 383, 392 n.2 (1981). Therefore, Congress should statutorily create a
work-product privilege for tax accrual workpapers prepared in connection with an
audit of a public company that is similar to the attorney's work-product privilege
established in the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26. See United States v. Arthur
Young & Co., 677 F.2d 211, 220 (1982); Note, supra note 43, at 624-25. This privilege
would protect "mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, and legal theories" con-
tained in the tax accrual workpapers from IRS scrutiny; factual information incorpo-
rated in the tax accrual workpapers would be accessible upon a "showing that the
party seeking discovery has substantial need of the materials. . . and that he is un-
able without undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent." See FED. R. Civ.
P. 26(b)(3); Note, supra note 43, at 624-25. As former Commissioner of Internal Rev-
enue Mortimer Caplin stated, "the primary source of the information is the taxpayer's
records, these [tax accrual] workpapers are to be sought only sparingly and with dis-
cretion - and then only as a procedure of last resort." Caplin, supra note 3, at 199.
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